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Abstract
We study policies aiming to minimize the weighted sum of completion times of jobs in the
context of coordination mechanisms for selfish scheduling problems. Our goal is to design local
policies that achieve a good price of anarchy in the resulting equilibria for unrelated machine
scheduling. To obtain the approximation bounds, we introduce a new technique that while
conceptually simple, seems to be quite powerful. The method entails mapping strategy vectors
into a carefully chosen inner product space; costs are shown to correspond to the norm in this
space, and the Nash condition also has a simple description. With this structure in place, we
are able to prove a number of results, as follows.
First, we consider Smith’s Rule, which orders the jobs on a machine in ascending processing
time to weight ratio, and show that it achieves an approximation ratio of 4. We also demon-
strate that this is the best possible for deterministic non-preemptive strongly local policies.
Since Smith’s Rule is always optimal for a given fixed assignment, this may seem unsurprising,
but we then show that better approximation ratios can be obtained if either preemption or
randomization is allowed.
We prove that ProportionalSharing, a preemptive strongly local policy, achieves an approxi-
mation ratio of 2.618 for the weighted sum of completion times, and an approximation ratio of
2.5 in the unweighted case. Again, we observe that these bounds are tight. Next, we consider
Rand, a natural non-preemptive but randomized policy. We show that it achieves an approxi-
mation ratio of at most 2.13; moreover, if the sum of the weighted completion times is negligible
compared to the cost of the optimal solution, this improves to π/2.
Finally, we show that both ProportionalSharing and Rand induce potential games, and thus
always have a pure Nash equilibrium (unlike Smith’s Rule). This also allows us to design the
first combinatorial constant-factor approximation algorithm minimizing weighted completion
time for unrelated machine scheduling. It achieves a factor of 2 + ǫ for any ǫ > 0, and involves
imitating best response dynamics using a variant of ProportionalSharing as the policy.
∗This work was supported in part by NSF grant CCF0830516, by FONDECYT grant 1090050, and by Andreas
Mentzelopoulos Scholarships for the University of Patras.
†cole@cims.nyu.edu. Courant Institute, New York University, N.Y.
‡
jcorrea@dii.uchile.cl. Departamento de Ingenier´ıa Industrial, Universidad de Chile.
§
gkatz@cims.nyu.edu. Courant Institute, New York University, N.Y.
¶mirrokni@google.com. Google Research, New York, N.Y.
‖
olver@math.mit.edu. Department of Mathematics, MIT.
1 Introduction
Traditionally, work in operations research has focused on finding globally optimal solutions for
optimization problems. In tandem, computer scientists have long studied the effects of a lack
of different kinds of resources, mainly the lack of computational resources in optimization. In
designing massive decentralized systems, the lack of coordination among different participating
agents has become an important consideration. This issue is typically addressed through distributed
algorithms in which a central authority designs mechanisms (protocols) specifying the rules of the
game, with the goal that the independent and selfish choices of the users result in a socially desirable
outcome. To measure the performance of these algorithms, the global objective function (social
cost) is evaluated at equilibrium points for selfish users. For games, probably the most accepted
such measure is the price of anarchy [38], the worst case ratio of the social cost at a Nash equilibrium
to that at a social optimum; the same measure can be used for coordination mechanisms; sometimes
we call this their approximation factor to highlight that this is a distinct measure.
The by now standard approach to bound the price of anarchy (PoA) when social cost is taken
to be the sum of individual costs works as follows [41]. First, the social cost is bounded by using
the equilibrium conditions, noting that an individual is better off at equilibrium than she would be
if she unilaterally changed her strategy to the one she would use in a centralized optimum. Second,
the actual (weighted) sum of player costs is also upper bounded, using an appropriately chosen
inequality, by a linear combination of the social cost of the equilibrium and the social cost of an
optimal solution.
In this paper we establish a methodology to deal with the second step of this proof scheme.
Our method interprets the sum in the second step as an inner product on a suitable space. Then,
we apply the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality in the chosen inner product space, and go back to the
original space by applying a minimum norm distortion inequality. Many of the existing results
employ a special case of this approach in which the costs can be expressed in terms of quadratic
polynomials to which the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality can be applied directly without the need for
an intermediate inner product space. We apply our new method in the context of scheduling jobs
on unrelated machines. Our method elucidates the hidden structure in the games we consider.
Once the framework has been set up, our proofs become short and elegant, thus we anticipate that
this method may prove useful elsewhere too.
Specifically, we consider the classic problem of scheduling n jobs on m unrelated machines from
a game theoretic perspective. In this situation, job j takes time pij if processed on machine i, and
also has an associated weight wj. Although the central goal is to minimize the weighted sum of
completion times of jobs, we consider the scheduling game in which each job is a fully informed
player wanting to minimize its individual weighted completion time, while each machine announces
a policy which it will follow in processing the jobs it is assigned. Our goal is to choose the policy
so as to minimize the approximation ratio of the actual costs under this policy to the optimal costs
obtainable under any policy. To this end, several approaches imposing incentives on self-interested
agents have been proposed, including some using monetary transfers [7, 17, 26, 12], and others
enforcing strategies on a fraction of users as a Stackelberg strategy [6, 37, 40, 49]. Ultimately
one could also apply a VCG mechanism to achieve social efficiency. The main drawback of these
methods is the need for global knowledge of the system. A different approach, and the focus of our
paper, uses coordination mechanisms [15], which only require local computations.
More formally, a coordination mechanism [15, 35, 4, 10, 22] is a set of local policies, one per
machine, specifying how the jobs assigned to that machine are scheduled. Here, local means that
a machine’s schedule must be a function only of the jobs it is assigned, allowing the policy to be
implemented in a distributed fashion. We actually study strongly local policies, meaning that the
schedule of any machine i is a function only of the processing times pij, weights wj and IDs of jobs
assigned to it. It will also be useful (especially when considering lowerbounds) for us to restrict
attention to policies that always use the full capacity of a machine, and release jobs immediately
upon completion. We call such policies prompt.
Several local policies have been studied for machine scheduling problems in the context of
both greedy and local search algorithms [34, 25, 42, 21, 1, 5, 8, 50], as well as coordination
mechanisms [38, 20, 15, 35, 4, 10, 22]. Previous work mainly considered the makespan social cost
as opposed to the weighted sum of completion times addressed here.
Our Results. Employing our new technique, we develop the first constant-factor approximate
coordination mechanisms for the selfish machine scheduling problem for unrelated machines. We
start by studying Smith’s Rule [48], in which machines process jobs in increasing order of their
processing time to weight ratio. Here the space that appropriately fits our method is L2 and a
norm distortion inequality is in fact not needed. We prove that the approximation factor for this
policy is exactly 4, improving upon a result by Correa and Queyranne [19]. We also show that
this is the best possible among all deterministic and non-preemptive strongly local coordination
mechanisms, assuming the prompt property.
The constant approximation ratio for the weighted sum of completion times is in sharp con-
trast to the known super-constant inapproximability results for coordination mechanisms for the
makespan function [4, 27] (e.g., an Ω(m) lower bound for the shortest-first coordination mechanism).
In fact, it is still open whether there is a coordination mechanism with a constant approximation
ratio for the makespan function.
Next, we go beyond the approximation ratio of 4 using preemptive1 and randomized mecha-
nisms. First, we consider a preemptive policy, generalizing that of Du¨rr and Thang [22], in which
each machine splits its processing capacity among its assigned jobs in proportion to their weights.
We uncover a close connection of this policy to Smith’s Rule, allowing us to apply a similar proof
strategy, but yielding a significantly improved approximation factor of 2.618. On the other hand,
we prove that with anonymous jobs, no set of deterministic prompt policies, be they preemptive or
not, can achieve a factor better than 2.166. To break this new barrier we consider a policy in which
jobs are randomly, but non-uniformly, ordered, based on their processing time to weight ratio.
Under this policy the appropriate space has to be carefully chosen and uses a rather nonstandard
inner product, induced by a Hilbert matrix, whose i, j entry equals 1/(i+ j−1). A norm distortion
inequality is then needed to relate the norm in this space to the original cost of an optimal schedule,
leading to yet another improvement in the approximation factor to 2.134. Moreover, we show a
lower bound of 5/3 > 1.666 for this policy.
Finally, inspired by our preemptive mechanism, along with the β-nice notion of [3], we design
a new combinatorial (2 + ǫ)-approximation algorithm for optimizing the weighted sum of comple-
tion times on unrelated machines. This improves on the approximation factor of our mechanisms
and complements the known non-combinatorial constant-factor approximation algorithms: a linear
programming based 16/3-approximation algorithm [30], then an improvement to 32 + ǫ again based
on linear programming [43], and finally the best currently known factor, a 32 -approximation based
on a convex quadratic relaxation [45, 46].
We obtain a number of other results, most of which are discussed in the appendices. For the
unit weight case, using Smith’s Rule, we obtain a constant upper bound on the price of anarchy by
a reduction from the priority routing model of Farzad et al. [24], as shown in Appendix C; however,
the resulting bound is not optimal. In the unit weight case, our preemptive mechanism simplifies
1By preemption we mean that the computation of a job is suspended and, implicitly, resumed later.
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to one, called EqualSharing [22], in which jobs share the processing capacity of a machine equally.
Then the approximation ratio is 2.5, which follows either by a careful analysis based on local moves,
or using our method with a modified Cauchy-Schwartz inequality. In addition, in the case where
the weighted sum of processing times is negligible compared to the total cost, our randomized
policy has an approximation ratio of π/2, which is tight. The latter follows by an interesting norm
distortion inequality obtained by Chung et al. [16], for which we provide an alternative shorter
proof. Furthermore, although for the Smith’s Rule policy pure equilibria may not exist [19], we
show that all our preemptive and randomized mechanisms result in exact potential games. This
implies that best-response dynamics of players converge to pure Nash Equilibria (PNE) and verifies
that PNE always exist. While we present our results for pure strategies and pure Nash equilibria,
we observe that all the results can be stated within the smoothness framework of Roughgarden [41],
and so all the bounds hold for more general equilibrium concepts including mixed Nash equilibria
and correlated equilibria. We assume that jobs aim at minimizing their weighted completion time
in the case of deterministic policies, and expected weighted completion time for randomized ones.
It is important to stress that these bounds are on the price of anarchy (or approximation
ratio) of coordination mechanisms and not that of games; thus these results do not follow from
seemingly similar bounds for selfish routing [2]. The fact that our preemptive policy performs
better than non-preemptive ones is in contrast to existing results for the makespan social cost
function where the EqualSharing policy achieves an approximation ratio of Θ(m) [22], no better
than ShortestFirst, which schedules jobs in increasing order of their processing times (i.e., Smith’s
Rule in the unweighted case). In order to explain this counter-intuitive result, we show that both
our preemptive policy and our randomized policy penalize each job with an extra charge beyond
its cost under Smith’s Rule that is exactly equal to the externality its scheduling causes.
Other Related Work. Scheduling problems have long been studied from a centralized optimiza-
tion perspective. We adopt the standard three filed notation α|β|γ [29]. The first parameter defines
the machine model, the last specifies the objective function, while the second will not concern us
in this paper.
Minimizing the sum of completion times is polynomial time solvable even for unrelated ma-
chines [33, 9]. For identical parallel machines (P | |∑ cj), the ShortestFirst policy leads to an optimal
schedule at any pure Nash equilibrium2 [18]. On the other hand, minimizing the weighted sum
of completion times is NP-complete even for identical machines (P | |∑wjcj) [39]. Although the
latter admits a PTAS [47], the general unrelated case (R| |∑wjcj) is APX-hard [32] and constant
factor approximation algorithms have been proposed [30, 43, 45, 46].
Coordination mechanism design was introduced by Christodoulou, Koutsoupias and Nana-
vati [15]. They analyzed the LongestFirst policy w.r.t. the makespan for identical machines (P | |Cmax)
and also studied a selfish routing game. Immorlica et al. [35] study four coordination mechanisms
for different machine scheduling problems and survey the results for these problems. They fur-
ther study the speed of convergence to equilibria and the existence of PNE for the ShortestFirst
and LongestFirst policies. Azar, Jain, and Mirrokni [4] showed that the ShortestFirst policy and in
fact any strongly local ordering policy (defined in Section 2) does not achieve an approximation
ratio better than Ω(m). Additionally, they presented a non-preemptive local policy that achieves
an approximation ratio of O(logm) and a policy that induces potential games and gives an ap-
proximatition ratio of O(log2m). Caragiannis [10] showed an alternative O(logm)-approximate
coordination mechanism that minimizes makespan for unrelated machine scheduling and does lead
to potential games. Fleischer and Svitkina [27] show a lower bound of Ω(logm) for all local or-
2In [35] it is shown that these equilibria are exactly the solutions generated by the shortest-first greedy algorithm.
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dering policies. It is still open whether there exists a coordination mechanism (even preemptive or
randomized) achieving a constant approximation ratio for the makespan objective function.
More recently, Du¨rr and Thang proved that the EqualSharing policy results in potential games,
and achieves a PoA of Θ(m) for R| |Cmax. In the context of coordination mechanisms, an instance
for which a preemptive policy has an advantage over non-preemptive ones was also shown by Cara-
giannis [10], who presented a local preemptive policy with approximation factor O(logm/log logm),
beating the lower bound of Ω(logm) for local ordering policies [27]. Correa and Queyranne [19]
study the problem of minimizing the weighted sum of completion times, show that Smith’s Rule
may induce games that do not have PNE, and that the price of anarchy under this policy is 4 in a
more restricted environment than that considered here.
Coordination mechanisms are related to local search algorithms. Starting from a solution, a local
search algorithm iteratively moves to a neighbor solution which improves the global objective. This
is based on a neighborhood relation that is defined on the set of solutions. The local improvement
moves in the local search algorithm correspond to the best-response moves of users in the game
defined by the coordination mechanism. The speed of convergence and the approximation factor
of local search algorithms for scheduling problems have been studied mainly for the makespan
objective function [21, 23, 25, 34, 42, 44, 50, 1, 5]. Our combinatorial approximation algorithm
for the weighted sum of completion time is the first local search algorithm for R||∑wiCi and is
different from the previously studied algorithms for the makespan objective.
2 Preliminaries
Throughout this paper, let J be a set of n jobs to be scheduled on a set I of m machines. Let
pij denote the processing time of job j ∈ J on machine i ∈ I and let wj denote its weight (or
importance or impatience). Our goal is to minimize the weighted sum of the completion times
of the jobs, i.e.
∑
j∈J wjcj , where cj is the completion time of job j. An assignment of jobs to
machines is represented by a vector x, where xj gives the machine to which job j is assigned.
The main scheduling model we study is unrelated machine scheduling (R| |∑wjcj) in which the
pij’s are arbitrary. Another model is the restricted related machines model in which each machine
i has a speed qi and each job j has a processing requirement pj: job j can be scheduled only on
a subset Tj of the machines, with processing time pij = pj/qi for i ∈ Tj , and pij = ∞ otherwise.
The restricted identical machines model is the special case of the restricted related machines model
where all machines have the same speed.
A coordination mechanism is a set of local policies, one for each machine, that determines how
to schedule the jobs assigned to that machine. It thereby defines a game in which there are n agents
(jobs) and each agent’s strategy set is the set of machines I. Given an assignment x, the disutility
of job j is its weighted completion time wjcj(x), as determined by the policy on the machine xj .
The goal of each job is to choose a strategy (i.e., a machine) that minimizes its disutility. A strategy
profile x is a Nash equilibrium if no player has an incentive to change strategy. Our goal is to design
coordination mechanisms which give such incentives to the players, that selfish behavior leads to
equilibria with low social cost.
A game is a potential game if there exists a potential function over strategy profiles such that
any player’s deviation leads to a drop of the potential function if and only if its cost drops. A
potential game is exact if after each move, the changes to the potential function and to the player’s
cost are equal. It is easy to see that a potential game always possesses a PNE.
We define a machine’s policy to be prompt if the machine uses its full capacity and does not
delay the release of any of its completed jobs. We say that a policy satisfies the independence of
irrelevant alternatives or IIA property if for any pair of jobs, their relative ordering is independent
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of what other jobs are assigned to the machine. This property property appears as an axiom
in voting theory, bargaining theory and logic. Notice that deterministic non-preemptive policies
with the IIA property can be described simply by a fixed ordering of all jobs; jobs are scheduled
according to this order. Thus we call such policies ordering policies.
Here and throughout the paper, we use the shorthand notation ρij for the ratio pij/wj . The
coordination mechanisms we study in this paper use the same local policy on each machine, so
henceforth we refer to a coordination mechanism using the name of the policy. The main policies
we discuss are the following:
SmithRule [48]: Jobs on machine i are scheduled consecutively in increasing order of ρij. In the
unweighted case, this reduces to the ShortestFirst policy.
ProportionalSharing: Jobs are scheduled in parallel using time-multiplexing. At any moment in
time, each uncompleted assigned job receives a fraction of the processor time equal to its weight
divided by the total weight of uncompleted jobs on the machine. In the unweighted case, this gives
the EqualSharing policy.
Rand: This randomized policy has the property that for any two jobs j, j′ assigned to machine i,
the probability that job j is run before job j′ is exactly
ρij′
ρij+ρij′
. Thus larger (w.r.t. ρij) jobs are
more likely to appear later in the ordering. We show how to implement this policy in Section 4.2.
For any configuration x, let wjc
α
j (x) and C
α(x) denote the cost for player j and the social cost
respectively, where α ∈ {SR,PS, SF,ES,R} denotes the policy, namely SmithRule, Proportional-
Sharing, ShortestFirst, EqualSharing and Rand, respectively. Finally, slightly abusing notation, let
Xi = {j ∈ J | xj = i} denote the set of jobs that have chosen machine i in configuration x, and
define X∗i analogously for x
∗.
A local policy for machine i uses only the information about the jobs on the same machine i, but
it can look at all the parameters of these jobs, including their processing times on other machines.
By contrast, a strongly local policy may depend only on the processing time that these jobs have
on this machine i.
In order to quantify the inefficiency caused by the lack of coordination, we use the notion of
price of anarchy [38], that is, the ratio between the social cost value of the worst Nash equilibrium
and that of the social optimum. To be more precise, we are interested in upper bounds for the PoA
of coordination mechanisms rather than the PoA of specific games. Applying [15] to the current
context, the PoA of a coordination mechanism is defined to be the maximum ratio, taken over all
the games G that the mechanism may induce, of the social cost of a Nash equilibrium of G divided
by the optimum social cost achievable for the scheduling problem underlying G.
3 Deterministic Non-Preemptive Coordination Mechanisms
It is known that given an assignment of jobs to machines, in order to minimize the weighted sum
of completion times, SmithRule is optimal [48]. It is therefore only natural to consider this policy
as a good first candidate. Our first theorem shows that using this rule will result in Nash equilibria
with social cost at most a constant-factor of 4 away from the optimum.
Our analysis uses the map ϕ : IJ → L2([0,∞))I , which maps a configuration to a vector of
functions as follows. If f = ϕ(x), then
fi(y) =
∑
j∈Xi:ρij≥y
wj (recall that ρij = pij/wj).
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We let 〈g, h〉 := ∫∞0 g(y)h(y)dy denote the usual inner product on L2, and in addition define
〈f ,g〉 :=∑i∈I〈fi, gi〉. In both cases, ‖ · ‖ refers to the induced norm. We also define
η(x) =
∑
j∈J
wjpxjj .
We then have
Lemma 3.1. For any configuration x, CSR(x) = 12〈ϕ(x), ϕ(x)〉+ 12η(x).
Proof. Let f = ϕ(x). We have
〈ϕ(x), ϕ(x)〉 =
∑
i∈I
∫ ∞
0
fi(y)
2dy
=
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈Xi
∑
k∈Xi
wjwk
∫ ∞
0
1ρij≥y1ρik≥ydy
=
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈Xi
∑
k∈Xi
wjwkmin{ρij , ρik}
=
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈Xi
wj
(
2
∑
k∈Xi
ρik≤ρij
pik − pij
)
= 2CSR(x)− η(x).
The result follows.
Theorem 3.2. The price of anarchy of SmithRule for unrelated machines (R| |∑wjcj) is at most
4.
Proof. Let x and x∗ be two assignments, with x a Nash equilibrium, and write f = ϕ(x), f∗ =
ϕ(x∗). We assume for simplicity that all jobs have distinct ratios (of processing time to weight).
(This assumption is just for simplicity; alternatively, we could introduce a tie breaking rule.)
We first calculate a job j’s completion time according to x, and use the Nash condition:
cSRj =
∑
k:xk=xj
ρxkk<ρxjj
pxkk + pxjj ≤
∑
k:xk=x
∗
j
ρxkk<ρx∗j j
pxkk + px∗j j .
So CSR(x) =
∑
j
wjc
SR
j ≤
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈X∗i
( ∑
k∈Xi
ρik<ρij
wjwk
pik
wk
+ pijwj
)
≤
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈X∗i
∑
k∈Xi
wjwkmin{ρik, ρij} +
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈X∗i
pijwj
=
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈X∗i
∑
k∈Xi
wjwk
∫ ∞
0
1ρij≥y1ρik≥ydy + η(x
∗)
= 〈f∗,f〉 + η(x∗).
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Now applying Cauchy-Schwartz, followed by the inequality ab ≤ a2+b2/4 for a, b ≥ 0, we obtain
CSR(x) ≤ ‖f‖‖f∗‖ + η(x∗)
≤ ‖f∗‖2 + 14‖f‖2 + η(x∗)
≤ 2CSR(x∗) + 12CSR(x) by Lemma 3.1.
Hence CSR(x) ≤ 4CSR(x∗).
The following result, proved in Appendix A, shows that (assuming promptness) no deterministic
non-preemptive strongly local mechanism can do better than SmithRule. This also implies that the
bound of Theorem 3.2 is tight.
Theorem 3.3. The pure PoA of any strongly local deterministic non-preemptive prompt coordi-
nation mechanism is at least 4. This is true even for the case of restricted identical machines
(B| |∑wjcj) with unweighted jobs.
4 Improvements with Preemption and Randomization
4.1 Preemptive Coordination Mechanism
In this section, we study the power of preemption and present ProportionalSharing, a preemptive
mechanism that is strictly better w.r.t. the PoA than any deterministic non-preemptive strongly
local policy. These results create a clear dichotomy between such policies and ProportionalSharing.
This may seem counter-intuitive at first, since, given an assignment of jobs to machines, using
ProportionalSharing instead of SmithRule only increases the social cost3 and doesn’t decrease the
cost of any player.
A better understanding of this result can be obtained by observing that in our context, pre-
emptive policies can be thought of (and also implemented) as non-preemptive but also non-prompt
policies. Jobs are run in an appropriate order, but possibly delayed past their completion time.
(Notice however that such an implementation would technically disallow anonymous jobs, i.e., jobs
that do not have IDs.) From this perspective, ProportionalSharing can be implemented by using
SmithRule to determine the processing order, but then holding each job back after it is completed
by an amount equal to the total delay it causes to other jobs SmithRule schedules after it. This fact
can be seen explicitly in the first equation of the upcoming Lemma 4.1. In this way, the interests
of a player are aligned with those of the group by having it “internalize its externalities”, leading
not only to better allocations but also to a better social cost, despite the extra charges. Additional
advantages of this coordination mechanism are that, unlike SmithRule, it can handle anonymous
jobs, and the games it induces always possess PNE.
Lemma 4.1. Given an assignment x, the weighted completion time of a job j on some machine i
using ProportionalSharing (whether currently assigned there or not) is
wjc
PS
j =
∑
k∈Xi\{j}
ρik≤ρij
wjpik +
∑
k∈Xi
ρik>ρij
wkpij + wjpij
=
∑
k∈Xi\{j}
wjwkmin{ρik, ρij} + wjpij. (1)
3Note that this is not the case for the makespan social cost function.
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Proof. We notice that the completion time of job j is only affected by the amount of “work” that
the processor has completed by that time and not by the way this processing time has been shared
among the jobs. For job j and any job k such that ρik ≤ ρij, we know that their whole processing
demands, pij and pik respectively, have been served. On the other hand, while job j is not complete,
for each wj units of processing time it receives, any job k with ρik > ρij receives wk units. Thus,
when job j is completed, the processing time spent on any such job k will be exactly
pijwk
wj
. Adding
all these processing times and multiplying by player j’s weight, wj gives the lemma.
Theorem 4.2. The price of anarchy of ProportionalSharing for unrelated machines (R| |∑wjcj)
is at most φ + 1 = 3+
√
5
2 ≈ 2.618. Moreover, this bound is tight even for the restricted related
machines model.
Proof. By Lemma 4.1, we see that for any assignment x, CPS(x) = ‖ϕ(x)‖2; note the factor two
difference compared to the first term for SmithRule. Moreover, (1) is upper bounded by
∑
k∈Xi
wjwkmin{ρij , ρik} + wjpij,
and so the Nash condition implies that for any equilibrium x, and any other assignment x∗,
CPS(x) ≤
∑
j

 ∑
k:xk=x
∗
j
wjwkmin{ρx∗j j, ρx∗j k} + px∗j j


= 〈ϕ(x), ϕ(x∗)〉+ η(x∗).
This is identical to the equation we used (after an additional inequality) in the case of Smith’s
Rule.
Let x be a Nash assignment, x∗ an optimal assignment w.r.t. Smith’s Rule, and again define
f = ϕ(x), f∗ = ϕ(x∗). Following the same method of analysis as for Smith’s Rule, we obtain
CPS(x) ≤ ‖f‖‖f∗‖ + η(x∗)
≤ α‖f∗‖2 + 14α‖f‖2 + η(x∗)
≤ 2αCSR(x∗) + 14αCPS(x) + (1− α)η(x∗)
≤ (1 + α)CSR(x∗) + 14αCPS(x),
using that η(x∗) ≤ CSR(x∗). Setting α = (1 +√5)/4 yields CPS(x)/CSR(x∗) ≤ 3+
√
5
2 .
The tightness of this bound follows from a construction in [11], where in fact they show that
even if CPS is used for the cost of OPT , i.e., we consider the ratio CPS(x)/CPS(x∗), this can be
arbitrarily close to 1 + φ.
In the case of equal weights, we obtain the following slightly improved bound. This result can
be proven in our framework but using a variation of the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality derived from
Lemma 4.4 below. However, we present here a different proof approach of independent interest.
Theorem 4.3. The price of anarchy of EqualSharing for unrelated machines (R| |∑ cj) is at most
2.5. This bound is tight even for the restricted related machines model.
Proof. We begin by proving the following lemma, which gives a tighter version of an inequality
initially used by Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [14]:
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Lemma 4.4. For every pair of non-negative integers k and k∗,
k∗(k + 1) ≤ 1
3
k2 +
5
3
k∗(k∗ + 1)
2
.
Proof. After some algebra, this translates to showing that for all non-negative integers k and k∗,
5k∗2 + 2k2 − 6k∗k − k∗ ≥ 0.
We start by taking the partial derivative of the LHS w.r.t. k, i.e. 4k − 6k∗, from which we infer
that for any given value of k∗, the LHS is minimized when k = 32k
∗. On substituting this into our
inequality, we obtain:
5k∗2 + 2(
3
2
k∗)2 − 6k∗ 3
2
k∗ − k∗ ≥ 0⇒ k∗2 ≥ 2k∗,
which is true for k∗ = 0 and k∗ ≥ 2. For k∗ = 1 our inequality becomes k2 − 3k + 2 ≥ 0 which is
true for all non-negative integers k.
Now, using this lemma, we show that for any machine i:
∑
j∈X∗i
cESj (x−j , x
∗
j) ≤
1
3
∑
j∈Xi
cESj (x) +
5
3
∑
j∈X∗i
cSFj (x
∗).
In order to show this, we first prove that this inequality only becomes tighter if for any two jobs
j, j′ ∈ Xi ∪X∗i , their processing times on i are equal, i.e. pij = pij′ . Assume that not all processing
times are equal and let Max i = {j ∈ Xi ∪ X∗i | ∀j′ ∈ Xi ∪ X∗i , pij ≥ pij′} be the set of jobs of
maximum processing time among the two sets. Also, let k∗ = |Max i ∩X∗i | and k = |Max i ∩Xi| be
the number of maximum size jobs in sets X∗i and Xi respectively.
For all the jobs j ∈ Max i, we decrease pij by the minimum positive value ∆ such that the
cardinality of Maxi increases. After a change of this sort, the LHS drops by (k
∗(k+1))∆ while the
RHS drops by (13k
2+ 53
k∗(k∗+1)
2 )∆. Given Lemma 4.4 above, we conclude that the drop of the LHS
is always less than or equal to the drop of the RHS. Using the same inequality again, we conclude
that for unit jobs on machine i the inequality is always true; summing up over all i ∈ I yields:
∑
j∈J
cESj (x−j , x
∗
j ) ≤
1
3
∑
j∈J
cESj (x) +
5
3
∑
j∈J
cSFj (x
∗).
This gives a price of anarchy bound of 2.5.
The tightness of the bound follows from Theorem 3 of [11]. The authors present a load balancing
game lower bound, which is equivalent to assuming that all jobs have unit size and the machines
are using EqualSharing; thus the same proof yields a (pure) PoA lower bound for restricted related
machines and unweighted jobs.
On the negative side, we have the following (the proof of which can be found in Appendix A)
Proposition 4.5. When jobs are anonymous, the worst-case PoA of any deterministic prompt
coordination mechanism is at least 13/6.
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4.2 Randomized Coordination Mechanism
In this section we examine the power of randomization and present Rand, which outperforms any
prompt deterministic strongly local policy. Under Rand, for any pair of jobs on the same machine,
the externalities they cause each other are shared equally in expectation. This is achieved with the
following property: if two jobs j and j′ are assigned to machine i, then
P{j precedes j′ in the ordering} = ρij′
ρij + ρij′
. (2)
Recall ρij = pij/wj . A distribution over orderings with this property can be constructed as follows.
Starting from the set of jobs Xi assigned to machine i ∈ I, select job j ∈ Xi with probability
ρij/
∑
k∈Xi ρik, and schedule j at the end. Then remove j from the list of jobs, and repeat this
process. Note that this policy is different from a simple randomized policy that orders jobs uniformly
at random. In fact, this simpler policy is known to give an Ω(m) PoA bound for the makespan
function [35], and the same family of examples developed in [35] gives an Ω(m) lower bound for
this policy in our setting. Nevertheless, we will prove the following bounds:
Theorem 4.6. The price of anarchy when using the Rand policy is at most 32/15 = 2.133 · · · .
Moreover, if the sum of the processing times of the jobs is negligible compared to the social cost of
the optimal solution, this bound improves to π/2, which is tight.
The high level approach for obtaining the upper bound is in exactly the same spirit as the
previous section: find an appropriate mapping ϕ from an assignment into a convenient inner product
space.
For simplicity, we assume in this section that the processing times have been scaled such that
the ratios ρij are all integral. This assumption is inessential and easily removed. We also take κ
large enough so that, except for infinite processing times, ρij ≤ κ for all i ∈ I, j ∈ J .
An inner product space. The map ϕ we use gives the signature for each machine: in the
unweighted case, this simply describes how many jobs of each size are assigned to the machine.
Definition 4.7. Given an assignment x, its signature ϕ(x) ∈ Rm×κ+ is a vector indexed by a
machine i and a processing time over weight ratio r; we denote this component by ϕ(x)ir. Its value
is then defined as
ϕ(x)ir :=
∑
j∈Xi
ρij=r
wj .
We also let ϕ(x)i denote the vector (ϕ(x)i0, ϕ(x)
i
1, . . . , ϕ(x)
i
κ).
Let M be the κ× κ matrix given by
Mrs =
rs
r + s
.
Lemma 4.8. Let x be some assignment, and let u = ϕ(x). If job j is assigned to machine i, its
expected completion time is given by
cRj = (Mu
i)ρij +
1
2pij .
If j is not assigned to i, then its expected completion time upon switching to i would be
cRj = (Mu
i)ρij + pij.
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Proof. We consider case (i); (ii) is similar. So xj = i. The expected completion time of job j on
machine i is
cRj =
∑
k∈Xi\{j}
pikP{job k ahead of job j} + pij
=
∑
k∈Xi\{j}
pik
ρij
ρij + ρik
+ pij
=
∑
k∈Xi
pik
ρij
ρij + ρik
+ 12pij.
We can rewrite this in terms of the signature as
cRj =
∑
s
uisMρijs +
1
2pij = (Mu
i)ρij +
1
2pij.
A crucial observation is the following:
Lemma 4.9. The matrix M is positive definite.
Proof. Let D be the diagonal matrix with Drr = r. Then we have M = DHD, where the κ × κ
matrix H is given by Hrs =
1
r+s . This is a submatrix of the infinite Hilbert matrix
(
1
r+s−1
)
r,s∈N
.
The Hilbert matrix has the property that it is totally positive [13], meaning that the determinant
of any submatrix is positive. It follows immediately that H is positive definite, and hence so is
M .
Thus we may define an inner product by
〈u,v〉 :=
∑
i∈I
(ui)TMvi, (3)
with an associated norm ‖·‖. In addition, the total cost ∑j wjcRj (x) of an assignment x may be
written in the convenient form
CR(x) = ‖ϕ(x)‖2 + 12η(x). (4)
Competitiveness of Rand on a single machine. How well Rand performs on a single machine,
compared to the optimal SmithRule, turns out to play an important role. So suppose we have n
jobs with size pj and weight wj, for j ≤ n. The signature u is given by just ur =
∑
j:pj/wj=r
wj .
Notice that the weighted sum of completion times according to SmithRule and Rand respectively
are
uTSu+ 12
∑
j wjpj and u
TMu+ 12
∑
j wjpj,
where Srs =
1
2 min(r, s). The extra
∑
j wjpj terms only help, and in fact turn out to be negligible
in the worst case example; ignoring them, the goal is to determine maxu≥0 u
TMu
u
TSu
. So the question
is closely related to the worst-case distortion between two norms.
Interestingly, it turns out that this problem has been considered, and solved, in a different con-
text. In [16], Chung, Hajela and Seymour consider the problem of self-organizing sequential search.
In order to prove a tight bound on the performance of the “move-to-front” heuristic compared to
the optimal ordering, they show:
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Theorem 4.10 ([16]). For any sequence u1, u2, . . . , uk with ur > 0 for all r,∑
r,s
urus
rs
r + s
<
π
4
∑
r,s
urusmin{r, s}. (5)
Moreover, this is tight [28] (take pj = 1/j
2, wj = 1, and let n → ∞). We also present a quite
different proof of the theorem in Appendix B. All in all, we find that π/2 is a tight upper bound
on the competitiveness of Rand on a single machine. The following lemma (which may also be cast
as a norm distortion question), is much more easily demonstrated:
Lemma 4.11. For any assignment x, we have CR(x) ≤ 2CSR(x)− η(x).
Proof. Consider a particular machine i. We have∑
j,k∈Xi
wjwk
ρijρik
ρij + ρik
=
∑
j 6=k∈Xi
wjwk
ρijρik
ρij + ρik
+ 12
∑
j∈Xi
wjpij
≤
∑
j 6=k∈Xi
wjwkmin{ρij , ρik}+ 12
∑
j∈Xi
wjpij
=
∑
j,k∈Xi
wjwkmin{ρij , ρik} − 12
∑
j∈Xi
wjpij.
Summing over all machines gives
CR(x)− 12η(x) ≤ 2
(
CSR(x)− 12η(x)
)− 12η(x)
from which the bound is immediate.
The upper bound. We are now ready to prove the main theorem of this section.
Proof of Theorem 4.6. Let x be the assignment at a Nash equilibrium, and x∗ the assignment of
the optimal solution, and let u = ϕ(x) and u∗ = ϕ(x∗).
From the Nash condition and Lemma 4.8, we obtain
CR(x) ≤
∑
j∈J
wjc
R
j (x−j , x
∗
j )
≤
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈X∗i
wjM(u
i)ρij + η(x
∗)
=
∑
i∈I
(u∗i)TMui + η(x∗)
= 〈u∗,u〉+ η(x∗).
Applying Cauchy-Schwartz
CR(x) ≤ ‖u∗‖‖u‖+ η(x∗) (6)
≤ 23‖u∗‖2 + 38‖u‖2 + η(x∗),
Now recalling the definition of ϕ and applying Lemma 4.11, we obtain
CR(x) ≤ 23 (CR(x∗)− 12η(x∗)) + 38 (CR(x)− 12η(x)) + η(x∗)
≤ 23 (2CSR(x∗)− 32η(x∗)) + 38 (CR(x)− 12η(x)) + η(x∗)
≤ 43CSR(x∗) + 38CR(x).
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This gives a PoA of 32/15.
In the case where η(x∗) is negligible, we continue from (6):
CR(x) ≤ ‖u∗‖‖u‖
≤ 12‖u∗‖2 + 12‖u‖2
≤ π4CSR(x∗) + 12CR(x),
by Theorem 4.10 and Equation 4. Thus CR(x)/CSR(x∗) ≤ π/2.
As noted in Appendix A, a slight modification of the construction used to prove Proposition 4.5
can be used to show that the worst-case PoA of Rand is at least 5/3.
5 Existence of PNE and Algorithm
Existence of PNE. Under SmithRule it may happen that no pure Nash equilibrium exists [19].
Here we show that ProportionalSharing and Rand both induce exact potential games, which hence
always have PNE. For the case of ProportionalSharing, this generalizes [22, Theorem 3], which
addresses EqualSharing.
Theorem 5.1. The ProportionalSharing mechanism induces exact potential games, with potential
ΦPS(x) = 12C
PS(x) + 12η(x). (7)
Likewise, the Rand mechanism yields exact potential games with potential
ΦR(x) = 12C
R(x) + 12η(x). (8)
Proof. We give the proof for ProportionalSharing; the proofs for Rand and Approx are similar.
Consider an assignment x and a job j ∈ J , and let i be the machine to which j is assigned.
Define x′ as the assignment differing from x only in that job j moves to some machine i′ 6= i.
We may write the change in the potential function as
ΦPS(x′)− ΦPS(x) =
∑
k∈J
Dk +
1
2wj(pi′j − pij), (9)
where
Dk =
1
2wk
(
cPSk (x
′)− cPSk (x)
)
.
Consider a job k 6= j on machine i. Since only job j left the machine, we have from Lemma 4.1
that
cPSk (x
′)− cPSk (x) = −wj min{ρij , ρik}.
Thus
∑
k∈Xi\{j}
Dk = −12wj
∑
k∈Xi\{j}
wkmin{ρij , ρik}
= −12wj(cPSj (x) + pij).
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Similarly, considering jobs on i′ yields
∑
k∈Xi′
Dk =
1
2wj
∑
k∈Xi′
wkmin{ρi′j , ρi′k}
= 12wj(c
PS
j (x
′)− pi′j).
All other jobs are unaffected by the change, and so do not contribute to (9). Summing all terms
(including Dj), we obtain
ΦPS(x′)− ΦPS(x) = wj(cPSj (x′)− cPSj (x)),
exactly the change in the cost of job j.
A combinatorial approximation algorithm. Finally we define Approx, a deterministic strongly
local policy that we will use in order to design a combinatorial constant factor approximation al-
gorithm for the underlying optimization problem. The completion time of a job in this policy is
exactly its completion time if ProportionalSharing were being used plus its processing time, i.e.
cAj (x) = c
PS
j (x) + pxjj.
Following the proof of Theorem 5.1 we can show that ΦA(x) = 12C
A(x) + η(x) is a potential
function for the games induced by this mechanism, and following the proof of Theorem 4.2, the
PoA of the mechanism is at most 4. The advantage of this mechanism is that CA(x) = 2CSR(x)
for any configuration x and therefore, despite the larger PoA bound, computing an equilibrium
allocation for the induced game yields a scheduling algorithm with approximation ratio 2 (because
the scheduling algorithm, given the allocation, applies SmithRule and not Approx).
Computing such an allocation might be hard in general, but we show that imitating a natural
best response dynamics gives rise to a simple polynomial time local search (2 + ǫ)-approximation
algorithm. At each iteration, the scheduling algorithm reassigns the job which thereby obtains the
largest possible improvement in the Approx costing (a best response move). In other words, we use
Approx in order to find a good allocation and then switch to SmithRule.
In order to bound the running time of our local-search algorithm we will use the β-nice concept
of [3]. Given some configuration x, let
∆(x) =
∑
j
(
cj(x)− cj(x−j, x′j)
)
,
where x′j is the best response to x−j for player j. Awerbuch et al. [3] define an exact potential game
with potential function Φ and social cost function C to be β-nice if and only if, for any configuration
x, both Φ(x) ≤ C(x) and C(x) ≤ βOPT + 2∆(x) hold4. Among other dynamics, they consider
what they call basic dynamics, where in each step, among all players that can uniquely deviate
and improve their cost by some factor α, we choose the one with the largest absolute improvement,
and allow that player to move. They subsequently show the following lemma, where x∗ is the
configuration that minimizes the potential function.
Lemma 5.2 ([3]). Let 18 > ǫ > α. Consider an exact potential game that satisfies the β-nice
property and any initial state x0. Then basic dynamics generates a profile x with C(x) ≤ β(1 +
O(ǫ))OPT in at most O
(
n
ǫ log
(
Φ(x0)
Φ(x∗)
))
steps.
4In their definition, unlike ours, OPT denotes the optimum social cost w.r.t. the game’s cost functions.
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We define a coordination mechanism to be β-nice if all the games that it induces are β-nice with
OPT being the optimum social cost of the underlying machine scheduling problem, independent
of the coordination mechanism. Our next lemma shows that Approx satisfies these conditions.
Lemma 5.3. The Approx coordination mechanism is β-nice with β = 4.
Proof. It is easy to see that the potential function ΦA(x) = 12C
A(x)+η(x) satisfies ΦA(x) ≤ CA(x)
for all configurations x, since η(x) ≤ 12CA(x). Therefore, what we need to show is that:
CA(x) ≤ βCSR(x∗) + 2∆(x),
where
∆(x) =
∑
j∈J
(
wjc
A
j (x)− wjcAj (x−j, x′j)
)
,
and x′j is the best response for player j in configuration x. We note that since c
A
j (x−j, x
′
j) ≤
cAj (x−j, x
∗
j ), then:
CA(x)−
∑
j∈J
wjc
A
j (x−j , x
∗
j) ≤ ∆(x).
Now following the same approach as in the proof of Theorem 4.2, we easily obtain that the PoA is
at most 4. More specifically, we can obtain the inequality∑
j∈J
wjc
A
j (x−j , x
∗
j) ≤ 14CA(x) + 3CSR(x∗).
Summing these two inequalities and simplifying we obtain
CA(x) ≤ 4CSR(x∗) + 43∆(x),
proving the lemma.
If we consider that every machine uses Approx, then, as a result of Lemma 5.3 along with
Lemma 5.2 and the fact that CA(x) = 2CSR(x) for any configuration x, we get the following
theorem bounding the running time of our algorithm.
Theorem 5.4. Starting from any initial configuration x0 and following basic dynamics leads to a
profile x with CSR(x) ≤ (2 +O(ǫ))OPT in at most O
(
n
ǫ log
(
ΦA(x0)
ΦA(x∗)
))
steps.
6 Concluding remarks
On mapping machines to edges of a parallel link network, the machine scheduling problem for the
case of related machines becomes a special case of general selfish routing games. In this context,
the ordering policies on machines correspond to local queuing policies at the edges of the network.
From this perspective, it would be interesting to generalize our results to network routing games.
Designing such local queuing policies would be an important step toward more realistic models
of selfish routing games when the routing happens over time [31, 24, 36]. We hope that our new
technique along with the policies proposed in this paper could serve as a building block toward this
challenging problem.
All the mechanisms discussed here are strongly local. For the case of the makespan objective,
one can improve the approximation ratio from Θ(m) to Θ(logm) by using local policies instead
of just strongly local policies. It remains open whether there are local policies that perform even
better than our strongly local ones.
15
Acknowledgements. We thank Tanmoy Chakraborty for helpful discussions and Ioannis Cara-
giannis for pointing out related literature. The fourth author also thanks Yossi Azar for initial
discussions about the subject of study of this paper. Part of this work was done while the second
and last authors were visiting EPFL; we thank Fritz Eisenbrand for his hospitality.
References
[1] J. Aspnes, Y. Azar, A. Fiat, S.A. Plotkin, and O. Waarts. On-line routing of virtual circuits
with applications to load balancing and machine scheduling. J. ACM, 44(3):486–504, 1997.
[2] B. Awerbuch, Y. Azar, and A. Epstein. Large the price of routing unsplittable flow. In STOC,
pages 57–66, 2005.
[3] B. Awerbuch, Y. Azar, A. Epstein, V.S. Mirrokni, and A. Skopalik. Fast convergence to
nearly optimal solutions in potential games. In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce,
pages 264–273, 2008.
[4] Y. Azar, K. Jain, and V.S. Mirrokni. (almost) optimal coordination mechanisms for unrelated
machine scheduling. In SODA, pages 323–332, 2008.
[5] Y. Azar, J. Naor, and R. Rom. The competitiveness of on-line assignments. Journal of
Algorithms, 18:221–237, 1995.
[6] A. Bagchi. Stackelberg differential games in economic models. Springer-Verlag, 1984.
[7] M. Beckman, C.B. McGuire, and C.B. Winsten. Studies in the Economics of Transportation.
Yale University Press, 1956.
[8] A. Borodin, M. Nielsen, and C. Rackoff. (incremental) priority algorithms. In SODA, pages
752 – 761, 2002.
[9] J. Bruno, E.G. Coffman, and R. Sethi. Scheduling independent tasks to reduce mean finishing
time. Communications of the ACM, 17:382–387, 1974.
[10] I. Caragiannis. Efficient coordination mechanisms for unrelated machine scheduling. In SODA,
pages 815–824, 2009.
[11] I. Caragiannis, M. Flammini, C. Kaklamanis, P. Kanellopoulos, and L. Moscardelli. Tight
bounds for selfish and greedy load balancing. In ICALP (1), pages 311–322, 2006.
[12] I. Caragiannis, C. Kaklamanis, and P. Kanellopoulos. Taxes for linear atomic congestion
games. ACM Transactions on Algorithms (to appear).
[13] M.-D. Choi. Tricks or treats with the hilbert matrix. The American Mathematical Monthly,
90(5):301–312, May 1983.
[14] G. Christodoulou and E. Koutsoupias. The price of anarchy of finite congestion games. In
STOC, pages 67–73, 2005.
[15] G. Christodoulou, E. Koutsoupias, and A. Nanavati. Coordination mechanisms. Theor. Com-
put. Sci., 410(36):3327–3336, 2009.
16
[16] F. Chung, D. Hajela, and P. D. Seymour. Self-organizing sequential search and hilbert’s
inequalities. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 36(2):148–157, April 1988.
[17] R. Cole, Y. Dodis, and T. Roughgarden. How much can taxes help selfish routing? J. Comput.
Syst. Sci., 72(3):444–467, 2006.
[18] R.W. Conway, W.L. Maxwell, and L.W. Miller. Theory of Scheduling. Addison-Wesley, Read-
ing, MA, 1967.
[19] J.R. Correa and M. Queyranne. Efficiency of equilibria in restricted uniform machine schedul-
ing with minsum social cost. 2010 (manuscript).
[20] A. Czumaj and B. Vo¨cking. Tight bounds for worst-case equilibria. In SODA, pages 413–420,
2002.
[21] E. Davis and J.M. Jaffe. Algorithms for scheduling tasks on unrelated processors. J. ACM,
28(4):721–736, 1981.
[22] C. Du¨rr and N.K. Thang. Non-clairvoyant scheduling games. In SAGT, pages 135–146, 2009.
[23] E. Even-dar, A. Kesselman, and Y. Mansour. Convergence time to nash equilibria. In ICALP,
pages 502–513, 2003.
[24] B. Farzad, N. Olver, and A. Vetta. A priority-based model of routing. Chicago Journal of
Theoretical Computer Science, 2008(1).
[25] G. Finn and E. Horowitz. A linear time approximation algorithm for multiprocessor scheduling.
BIT, 19:312–320, 1979.
[26] L. Fleischer, K. Jain, and M. Mahdian. Tolls for heterogeneous selfish users in multicommodity
networks and generalized congestion games. In FOCS, pages 277–285, 2004.
[27] L. Fleischer and Z. Svitkina. Preference-constrained oriented matching. In ANALCO, pages
56–65, 2010.
[28] G.H. Gonnet, J.I. Munro, and H. Suwanda. Exegesis of self-organizing linear search. SIAM
Journal on Computing, 10(3):613–637, 1981.
[29] R.L. Graham, E.L. Lawler, J.K. Lenstra, and A.H.G. Rinnooy Kan. Optimization and approxi-
mation in deterministic sequencing and scheduling: A survey. Ann. Discrete Math., 5:287–326,
1979.
[30] L.A. Hall, A.S. Schulz, D.B. Shmoys, and J. Wein. Scheduling to minimize average completion
time: Off-line and on-line approximation algorithms. Math. Oper. Res., 22(3):513–544, 1997.
[31] M. Hoefer, V. S. Mirrokni, H. Ro¨glin, and S.-H. Teng. Competitive routing over time. In
WINE, pages 18–29, 2009.
[32] H. Hoogeveen, P. Schuurman, and G.J. Woeginger. Non-approximability results for scheduling
problems with minsum criteria. In IPCO, pages 353–366, 1998.
[33] W.A. Horn. Minimizing average flow time with parallel machines. Operations Research,
21(3):846–847, 1973.
17
[34] O.H. Ibarra and C.E. Kim. Heuristic algorithms for scheduling independent tasks on noniden-
tical processors. J. ACM, 24(2):280–289, 1977.
[35] N. Immorlica, L. Li, V.S. Mirrokni, and A.S. Schulz. Coordination mechanisms for selfish
scheduling. Theor. Comput. Sci., 410(17):1589–1598, 2009.
[36] S. Koch and M. Skutella. Nash equilibria and the price of anarchy for flows over time. Theory
of Computing Systems, to appear.
[37] Y.A. Korilis, A.A. Lazar, and A. Orda. Achieving network optima using Stackelberg routing
strategies. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 5(1):161–173, 1997.
[38] E. Koutsoupias and C. Papadimitriou. Worst-case equilibria. In STACS, pages 404–413, 1999.
[39] J.K. Lenstra, A.H.G. Rinnooy Kan, and P. Brucker. Complexity of machine scheduling prob-
lems. Ann. Discrete Math., 4:281–300, 1977.
[40] T. Roughgarden. Stackelberg scheduling strategies. In STOC, pages 104–113, 2001.
[41] T. Roughgarden. Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy. In STOC, pages 513–522, 2009.
[42] S. Sahni and Y. Cho. Bounds for list schedules on uniform processors. Siam J. of Computing,
9:91–103, 1980.
[43] A.S. Schulz and M. Skutella. Scheduling unrelated machines by randomized rounding. SIAM
J. Discrete Math., 15(4):450–469, 2002.
[44] P. Schuurman and T. Vredeveld. Performance guarantees of local search for multiprocessor
scheduling. In IPCO, pages 370–382, 2001.
[45] J. Sethuraman and M.S. Squillante. Optimal scheduling of multiclass parallel machines. In
SODA, pages 963–964, 1999.
[46] M. Skutella. Convex quadratic and semidefinite programming relaxations in scheduling. J.
ACM, 48(2):206–242, 2001.
[47] M. Skutella and G.J. Woeginger. A ptas for minimizing the total weighted completion time
on identical parallel machines. Math. Oper. Res., 25(1):63–75, 2000.
[48] W. Smith. Various optimizers for single stage production. Naval Res. Logist. Quart., 3(1-
2):59–66, 1956.
[49] H. von Stackelberg. Marktform und Gleichgewicht. Springer-Verlag, 1934. English translation
entitled The Theory of the Market Economy.
[50] T. Vredeveld. Combinatorial approximation algorithms. Guaranteed versus experimental per-
formance. 2002. Ph.D. thesis.
18
A Lower Bounds
Deterministic non-preemptive strongly local coordination mechanisms. Adapting a
proof of Caragiannis et al. [11, Theorem 7], Correa and Queyranne [19, Theorem 13], showed
that the pure PoA of games induced by SmithRule can be arbitrarily close to 4. This holds even
with unweighted jobs in the restricted identical machines model (a similar construction in [24] for
nonatomic prioritized selfish routing can also be easily adapted). Based on this construction, we
show the same lowerbound for arbitrary strongly local prompt policies that are deterministic and
non-preemptive. To aid in comprehension, we first demonstrate this for strongly local ordering
policies (i.e., deterministic non-preemptive policies where the IIA property holds). We then discuss
the changes needed to obtain the full result, but since the arguments are of a quite different flavour
from the rest of the paper, we give only a sketch.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. We begin by presenting the family of game instances that leads to pure PoA
approaching 4 for games induced by SmithRule in the restricted identical machines model [19], and
then show how to generalize the lowerbound based on this construction.
There are m machines and k groups of jobs g1, . . . , gk, where group gx has m/x
2 jobs. We
assume that m is such that all groups have integer size and let jxy denote the y-th job of the x-th
group. A job jxy can be assigned to machines 1, . . . , y, and we assume that for two jobs jxy and
jx′y′ with y < y
′, then jx′y′ has higher priority than jxy (if y − y′, the ordering can be arbitrary).
If every job jxy is assigned to machine y, there are exactly m/x
2 jobs with completion time x
(1 ≤ x ≤ k), which leads to a total cost of m∑kx=1 1/x. On the other hand, assigning each job
to the machine with smallest index among all the ones that minimize its completion time gives a
PNE assignment whose total cost is Ω(4m
∑k
x=1 1/x) [19].
Ordering policies. We may of course modify the construction so that each job i can be assigned
to only two machines: the machine Oj to which it is assigned under OPT , and the machine Nj it
assigned to under the Nash (where Nj ≤ Oj for all j). Since the job ordering under the optimal
assignment does not affect the cost, we only need to make sure that for any jobs j, j′ with Oj′ < Oj ,
j gets higher priority than j′ on Oj .
Given a specific lower bound instance for SmithRule, we have n job slots, each defined by the
pair of machines Oj and Nj . Given a set of ordering policies, each machine has its own strictly
ordered list of all n jobs. What we need to do is assign a specific job to each slot so that the
ordering restrictions as specified in the previous paragraph comply with the lists. We start from
the slot j with the greatest Nj machine index and we assign the first job of machine Nj’s list to this
slot. We then erase this job from all lists and repeat. In case of a tie, that is if there is more than
one slot with the same Nj, we first consider the slots with greater Oj machine index. This ensures
that, given the PNE assignment, any job that deviates back to its OPT machine will suffer cost at
least as much as in the SmithRule instance, while its cost in the PNE is the same as in the given
instance. Therefore, the assignment of each job j to machine Nj is a PNE for this set of ordering
policies.
Removing the IIA assumption. We modify the above construction to have N jobs, where N is
extremely large, and one extra machine (so we have M = m + 1 machines). Each machine has
an associated prompt policy (which may use job IDs); thus for any subset of jobs, the policy on a
machine will specify the order that the jobs are run. We will then choose only a small subset of n
jobs that will fill in the previously defined slots; the remaining jobs will all be assigned processing
time 0 on machine m+ 1, and infinity on all other machines; call such jobs spurious. By choosing
the assignment of jobs to slots appropriately, we will be able to enforce the orderings we want on
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the jobs, and obtain a Nash with the same cost as before. More precisely, we want the following,
which ensures that the proposed Nash assignment is indeed an equilibrium:
(i) In the Nash assignment, the ordering on any machine is exactly as we require in the previously
defined construction.
(ii) If we take the Nash assignment, but then any single job attempts to deviate, it will find itself
at the back of the ordering. More carefully: if Si is the set of jobs on machine i at Nash, and
we consider any job j with Oj = i, then j is last according to the ordering determined by
the set Si ∪ {j} and the policy on machine i. This ensures that nobody has an incentive to
deviate.
To prove this, we begin with the m-th machine, and argue that we can find a set Sm ⊂ J , with
|Sm| equal to the number of slots which have machine m as the Nash strategy, such that there is a
very large set Qm ⊂ J with the following property:
Every job j ∈ Qm is last in the ordering on machine m determined by the set Sm ∪ {j}.
We will assign Sm to the slots which run on machine m at OPT , and then make all jobs outside
of Sm and Jm spurious. We then repeat this process on machine m − 1, but selecting Sm−1 and
Qm−1 as subsets of Qm. This construction guarantees an ordering satisfying properties (i) and (ii).
The existence of the sets Si and Qi for all i follows from the following easily proved combinatorial
lemma, asuming that N is chosen sufficiently large.
Lemma A.1. Let k and r be integers, with k > r. For any subset S of [k] := {1, 2, ..., k}, let πS
be an ordering (permutation) of S, which may depend on S in an arbitrary manner, and define
QS := {j ∈ [k] \ S : j is last according to the order πS∪{j}}.
Then there exists a subset S of size r so that |QS | ≥ (k − r)/(r + 1).
Deterministic strongly local mechanisms. We give here a lower bound that applies to any
deterministic prompt strongly local coordination mechanism, even when preemption is allowed, as
long as jobs are anonymous.
Proof of Proposition 4.5. The construction is a slight variant of one given in Caragiannis et al. [11]
for load balancing games. We define the construction in terms of the game graph; a directed graph,
with nodes corresponding to machines, and arcs corresponding to jobs. The interpretation of an
arc (i∗, i) is that the corresponding machine is run on i at the Nash equilibrium, and i∗ in the
optimal solution (all jobs can only be run on at most two machines in the instance we construct).
Our graph consists of a binary tree of depth ℓ, with a path of length ℓ appended to each leaf
of the tree. In addition, there is a loop at the endpoint of each path. All arcs are directed towards
the root; the root is considered to be at depth zero. In the binary tree, on a machine at depth i,
the processing time of any job that can run on that machine is (3/2)ℓ−i. In the chain, on a machine
at distance k from the tree leaves all processing times are (1/2)k .
By slightly perturbing the processing times of jobs on different machines it is easily checked
that if every job is run on the machine pointed to by its corresponding arc, the assignment is a
pure NE. The latter holds for arbitrary prompt strongly local coordination mechanisms so long as
jobs are anonymous. On the other hand, if all jobs choose their alternative strategy, we obtain the
optimal solution. A straightforward calculation shows that, in the limit ℓ → ∞, the ratio of the
cost of the NE to the optimal cost converges to 13/6 > 2.166.
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Rand. The previous instance can be easily modified to give a lower bound on the performance of
Rand. Just take the same instance but replace 3/2 by 4/3 and 1/2 by 2/3. The same assignment
then gives a PNE, and in this case the ratio of interest approaches 5/3.
B The performance of Rand on a single machine
Proof of Theorem 4.10. We want to prove that for any sequence u1, . . . , uk, ui ≥ 0, the following
inequality holds: ∑
i
∑
j
uiuj
ij
i+ j
≤ π
4
∑
i
∑
j
uiujmin{i, j}.
We will in fact prove that for any sequence x1, x2, . . . , xn, xi ∈ N,∑
i
∑
j
xixj
xi + xj
<
π
4
∑
i
∑
j
min{xi, xj}. (10)
This implies the inequality in the statement, for the choice ur = |{i : xi = r}|, and hence clearly
for any integer sequence (ui). An obvious scaling argument then gives it for general nonnegative
ui.
Since both summations in (10) are symmetric, we may assume without loss of generality that
x1 ≥ · · · ≥ xn ≥ 0. Then, we note that
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1min{xi, xj} = 2
∑n
i=1 xi(i− 1/2). Also, observe
that the inequality is homogeneous so that proving the inequality is equivalent to proving that the
optimal value of the following concave optimization problem is less than π/2:
z = max


n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
xixj
xi + xj
: s.t.
n∑
i=1
xi(i− 1/2) = 1, x1 ≥ · · · ≥ xn ≥ 0

 .
Clearly z ≤ z′, where
z′ = max


n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
xixj
xi + xj
: s.t.
n∑
i=1
xi(i− 1/2) = 1, xi ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n

 .
Furthermore, we may assume that in an optimal solution all variables satisfy xi > 0. Otherwise,
we could consider the problem in a smaller dimension. Thus, the KKT optimality conditions state
that for all i = 1, . . . , n we have
µ(i− 1/2) = 2
n∑
j=1
(
xj
xi + xj
)2
. (11)
Multiplying by xi, summing over all i, and using
∑n
i=1 xi(i− 1/2) = 1, we obtain:
µ = 2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
xi
(
xj
xi + xj
)2
=
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
xixj
(xi + xj)2
(xi + xj) = z
′.
Now consider (11) with i∗ = argmaxi xi(i− 1/2)2. We have that
z′ =
2
i∗ − 1/2
n∑
j=1
(
xj
xi∗ + xj
)2
≤ 2(i∗ − 1/2)3
∞∑
j=1
(
1
(i∗ − 1/2)2 + (j − 1/2)2
)2
.
Using standard complex analysis it can be shown that the latter summation equals
(π/2)
(
(i∗ − 1/2)π tanh(π(i∗ − 1/2))2 + tanh(π(i∗ − 1/2)) − π(i∗ − 1/2)),
which is less than π/2.
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C A Reduction from Prioritized Selfish Routing
In this appendix, we show that in the unweighted case, and using ShortestFirst, the scheduling
games under consideration form a special cases of the priority selfish routing games defined in [24].
This suffices to give upper bounds on the price of anarchy for ShortestFirst, and in fact the correct
bound if the nonatomic case is considered.
A priority selfish routing game is defined as follows (except here, we will restrict ourselves to
the unweighted case, where all players have unit demand). We are given a directed graph G, and
a set of players j = 1, . . . , n; each player has an associated source-sink pair (sj, tj), and must pick
as their strategy some sj-tj path to route their demand.
Each arc e has an associated cost function fe, which we will take to be linear; fe(x) = aex+ be.
In the standard selfish routing game, the cost or delay experienced by a player using edge e is given
by fe(xe), where xe is the load on the edge, i.e. (taking unit demands) the number of players using
that edge. The total cost associated to an edge is then xefe(xe). In the priority selfish routing
model on the other hand, the total cost for an edge will be
∫ xe
0 fe(z)dz, the “area under the curve”.
This is split between the players using an edge, according to some ordering ≺e of the players using
edge e: The t’th player in the ordering pays an amount
∫ t
t−1 fe(x)dx. The ordering ≺e can be very
general, and may depend on the strategies chosen by all the players (even those not using edge e).
In [24], it is shown that in this model, the price of anarchy is at most 17/3 in the setting described
above, which improves to 4 in the nonatomic case where any individual player is negligible. These
upper bounds hold for any priority ordering.
We are now ready to describe the reduction. Begin with an instance of the scheduling game,
with policy given by ShortestFirst. By scaling if necessary, assume that all finite pij satisfy pij ≤ 1,
and let Q be such that Q · pij ∈ N for all finite pij. We construct a graph G as follows. There is a
single sink node t which will be the destination for all players. Each machine i will correspond to
a path Pi of length Q, and the cost function of each edge on the path will be simply fe(x) = x/Q.
Connect the end of each path to a common sink node t, with zero cost edges.
Now for each job j, we will have a source node sj, and a player with source sj and destination
t. For each machine i, we add an arc from sj to a node vij in the path corresponding to i, such
that the fraction of the path between vij and the end of the path (towards t) is exactly pij. The
cost of this arc will be a constant pij/2. To complete the definition of the priority selfish routing
instance, we define the priority ordering on any edge in Pi according to ShortestFirst, in increasing
order of pij .
There is a natural correspondence between an assignment in the scheduling problem and a
routing in the priority routing problem. If job j uses machine i, then route j from sj to vij and
then to t.
Lemma C.1. For any job j, the completion time cj of the job in the scheduling instance is the
same as the amount Cj player j pays in the derived priority routing instance.
Proof. Suppose job j uses machine i. In the routing instance, all larger (w.r.t. processing time)
jobs on the edge will not affect job j’s cost, since shorter jobs have higher priority, All smaller
jobs on the other hand will cause delays, on some subset of the edges on the path. In particular,
a job k with pik < pij causes a delay of 1 on a fraction pik of the edges on machine i’s path.
On an edge with ℓ players ahead of player j, j will pay an amount given by a trapezoidal area:
1
2Q(ℓ+ (ℓ+ 1)) =
ℓ+1/2
Q . Summing up the costs over all edges used by j, we get
Cj = pij/2 +
∑
k:pik<pij
pik + pij/2 = pij +
∑
k:pik<pij
pik.
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It follows immediately that the Nash equilibria of the scheduling game and the derived priority
routing coincide, and that social costs are also the same. Thus the worst-case price of anarchy of
the unweighted scheduling game is no worse than the worst-case price of anarchy in the unweighted
priority routing model, i.e., 17/3.
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